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Abstract
We empirically investigate whether the persistence of politicians in political insti-
tutions a¤ects the innovation activity of rms. We use 12,000 rm-level observations
from three waves of the Italian Observatory over Small and Medium Enterprises, and
introduce a measure of political persistence dened as the average length of individ-
ual political careers in political institutions of Italian municipalities. Standard OLS
shows no raw correlation between political persistence and rmsinnovation activity.
However, once the causal e¤ect is isolated by means of instrumental variables, using
death of politicians as an exogenous source of variation of political persistence, we nd
a robust negative relation between political persistence and the probability of process
innovation. This nding is consistent with the view that political stability may hinder
rms incentive to innovate to maintain their competitiveness, as long as they can
extract rents from long-term connections with politicians.
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1 Introduction
In many circumstances, the coexistence of long-lived economic and political elites is blamed
for countrieslow rate of technological innovation and economic growth. Through long-
lasting personal relations, contacts and acquaintances (knowing the right person in the
right place), the sociopolitical network between politicians and economic actors tends to
create a stable elite that rules the country, preventing the access to power by more dynamic
individuals. Although a (possibly negative) relationship between perpetuation of political
and economic power and innovation is often mentioned in policy debates, neither a well-
established economic theory nor convincing empirical evidence are available to support
this view.
To formally address these issues, in this paper we empirically investigate whether the
Italian local political environment, in particular the persistence of the same persons in the
local political institutions, a¤ects private rmspropensity to innovate. By concentrating
on a single country, we avoid concerns emerging when countries with very di¤erent insti-
tutional settings are put together in cross-country analysis. Yet, information on Italian
politicians is available at the local level, including municipality level, thus potentially pro-
viding substantial spatial variation in measures of persistence of politicians. Moreover, the
insu¢ cient replacement of power elite is often considered to be among the causes of Italys
economic decline. As Carboni [8] puts it, Italy is falling behind and the unconcern of our
elites about our future is probably the consequence of the obsolescence of the country and
of our circles of power ruled by a gerontocratic core(page 6, our translation).
We rst construct a measure of political persistence in Italian municipalities, where
persistence is dened as the average longevity in o¢ ce of individuals appointed in local
political institutions over a given period, from 1985 to 2007, the longest time span avail-
able, or a sub-period. Our measure of persistence considers the pool of politicians of a
municipality as the entity with which rms interact, rather than focusing on the individual
connection between a rm and a politician, as it the case in the literature about the im-
pact of political connections on rmseconomic performance (see for instance Faccio [15]).
Being based on individual data on political careers, our measure also di¤ers signicantly
from proxies for political stability that have been previously used in the literature (see for
example Alesina et al. [1]). We then merge these political data with socioeconomic data
that include, among others, relevant information on the location and innovation activity
of Italian small and medium enterprises for a total of about 12.000 observations in the
period 1998-2006.
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Using this detailed dataset, we perform a cross-sectional analysis where the proba-
bility of process innovation is related to political persistence in the municipality where
the rm is located. Due to the spurious correlation between our two main variables, we
estimate the model by instrumental variables, using the unexpected death of politicians
in a municipality as a source of exogenous variation in political persistence.
The main result of our empirical analysis is that, when we consider process innovation,
the innovation activity of rms located in a municipality is negatively a¤ected by the
average length in o¢ ce of local politicians. More specically, our instrumental variables
estimates suggest that a six months increase in politiciansaverage longevity lowers the
probability of process innovation by 15%, including province xed e¤ects and other controls
at the municipality and rm level. Moreover, we nd that older rms are more a¤ected
by political persistence than younger ones, and that the impact of political persistence
is slightly stronger for rms that operate in industries heavily dependent on the public
sector. Finally, when product innovation is considered rather than process innovation, the
negative e¤ect of political persistence vanishes.
In principle, political longevity has ambiguous e¤ects on innovation. On the one hand,
a stable political environment may reduce uncertainty regarding future policy choices
thereby increasing the expected return from long-term investment and innovation. On the
other hand, by exploiting long-term connections with politicians, rms may enjoy prefer-
ential treatment in terms of lower burden of administrative costs, easier access to credit
and production factors (e.g. public utilities) and public procurement.1 These advantages
may generate rents for incumbent rms, reducing their incentive to innovate to upgrade
technologies and increase productivity in order to maintain their competitive position.
Our empirical ndings, which support a negative impact of political persistence on
the probability of process innovation are consistent with the latter view. In a related
theoretical paper (see Bellettini, Berti Ceroni and Prarolo [3]) we put forward a possible
explanation for such negative relationship, whereby entrepreneurs might choose to invest
in time-consuming political connections, aimed at curbing bureaucratic costs, rather than
spend resources to innovate. In this framework, political persistence makes investment in
political connections protable for rms and reduces the incentive to innovate.
Our paper is related to various strands of literature. First, it belongs to the literature
on the external determinants of rmsinnovation activity, where the external determinant
1There is evidence that managers spend a sizable fraction of their working time in meeting with politi-
cians. Boeri et al. [5], using a survey on Italian CEOs, nd that the fraction of working time they spend
with politicians (7%) is comparable with the time spent in dealing with banks.
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we take into consideration is individual persistence in local political institutions. Many
contributions in this literature focus, instead, on the availability of credit, showing that
a well functioning, competitive banking system and the physical proximity of banks posi-
tively a¤ect rmsinnovation activity (see, among others, Bonaccorsi di Patti and Gobbi
[6], King and Levine [19] and Guiso et al. [18]). In particular, our empirical approach
borrows from the one developed by Benfratello et al. [4] who, using previous waves of the
same data on Italian rms, investigate the e¤ect of local banking development, measured
by the number of bank branches per capita in a province, on rmsinnovation activity.
Beside focusing on a completely di¤erent external determinant (political persistence rather
than nancial development), which involves the development of a new instrument specic
to our key explanatory variable, we have a ner spatial denition of the local environment,
at municipality, rather than province level. This allows us to control for province-specic
xed e¤ects (which may also capture banking development at province level) when we
investigate the e¤ect of our main explanatory variable.
Second, from a macroeconomic perspective, a large theoretical and empirical literature,
surveyed in Carmignani [9], suggests a positive link between governments term length
(political stability) and economic growth, as instability and the threat of changes in the
legislative environment make rms less willing to invest. Most of these studies rely on
measures of political instability based on revolutions, coups and assassinations, or the
frequency of government turnover, which are very di¤erent from ours, based on individual
data on the length of political careers.
Third, some contributions have used measures of political persistence similar to ours
to investigate di¤erent issues. Coviello and Gagliarducci [12] show that mayorslongevity
in o¢ ce in Italian municipalities negatively a¤ects the e¢ ciency of public procurement,
as the number of bidders of an auction and the winning rebate decrease, while the prob-
ability that the winning rm is an insider and that the contract is ex-post renegotiated
increase with longevity. Using cross-country data, Campante et al. [10] investigate the
relationship between corruption and political stability, measured as the average tenure
of chief executives and governing parties over a given period. Their empirical ndings
show that corruption tends to increase with stability in relatively stable environments, as
the prospect of long-term deals with the politicians raises rmswillingness to involve in
bribing and rent-seeking activities.
Finally, a growing literature studies the e¤ect of political connections on rmsperfor-
mance. Using Italian data, Cingano and Pinotti [13] look at the private returns and social
costs of politically connected rms matching data on Italian rmsemployees and politi-
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cians. Dening a rm as connected if a politician is among its employees, they quantify
the gain from political connection in a 5% increase in revenues, obtained through changes
in domestic sales and not through exports or productivity enhancements. Using interna-
tional data, Faccio [15] and Faccio et al. [16] highlight that whenever rms are owned
or managed by politicians (or their friends and relatives), their market value increases
and they are signicantly more likely to be bailed out than similar non-connected rms.2
Desai and Olofsgard [14] investigate the consequences of political connections on about
10.000 rms surveyed in 40 developing countries and nd that inuential rms face fewer
administrative and regulatory burdens and invest and innovate less.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and Section
3 presents our empirical strategy and estimation results. Section 4 concludes.
2 Data
To construct our dataset we use two main sources of information, the historical archive of
local administrators of the Italian Ministry of Internal A¤airs and waves eight, nine and
ten of the Observatory over Small and Medium Enterprises, that have been produced by
Capitalia (the rst two) and UniCredit. Other data come from the Italian Institute of
Statistics (ISTAT).
2.1 Municipality-level data
Our source of information for political variables is the historical archive of local adminis-
trators of the Italian Ministry of Internal A¤airs. This archive records yearly, between 1985
and 2007, and for each municipality (8095 in 2007), data on mayors (sindaci), councilmen
(consiglieri) and members of the executive committee (assessori).
The mayor and councilmen are elected and the mayor appoints the members of the
executive committee (giunta).3 In municipalities with less than 15000 inhabitants (90%
of the total) members of the executive committee can be chosen among councilmen, while
the two roles are incompatible in municipalities with more than 15000 inhabitants. Both
the giunta, i.e. the executive power, and the council, i.e. the legislative power, play a role
2The unexpected death of politicians has been used as a source of exogenous changes in political
connections of rms by Faccio and Parsley [17] and Roberts [22]. Our instrumental variable strategy is
inspired by these contributions.
3Electoral rules concerning the election of the mayor were changed in 1993. The mayor was appointed
by the winning party or coalition before, while he has been directly elected by citizens afterwards. Elections
took place every ve years for most of the time span under analysis.
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in setting and enforcing regulation that may a¤ect rmsactivities. According to Law
Decree n.267/2000, which collects laws ruling local administrations, their tasks include
the concession of public utilities, setting the rules of agreements for private provision of
public goods, designing the rules to which public utilities have to comply, organizing and
supervising tenders, ruling and deciding upon building permits, among others.
For each politician, we have information regarding name, surname, date of birth, posi-
tion held (sindaco/consigliere/assessore and role within the institution), dates of election,
appointment and resignation. The cause of resignation is also available. Using these
data, we build measures of political persistence PERSY 1 Y 2 for each municipality, where
PERSY 1 Y 2 is dened as the average number of years spent within local political insti-
tutions by politicians of a municipality in the period Y 1  Y 2. More specically, for each
individual (uniquely dened by his name, surname and birth date) we sum the length of
appointments served in the given period within a municipality and then take the average
over all individuals that served in that municipality. Taking politicianslongevity in o¢ ce
as a measure of inuence on municipalitys economic life, here we are possibly identify-
ing a lower bound. In fact, although politicians exit the sample once they are appointed
at province, regione or country level, their inuence on local issues may be even higher.
Moreover, before or after being appointed in political institutions, individuals may be em-
ployed as bureaucrats in municipal apparatuses, or in rms owned or controlled by the
municipality, where connections with the productive sector are also possible.
Descriptive statistics for PERS1985 2007 and PERS1985 2000 are collected in Table 1.4
The variable PERS1985 2007 exploits all available information, as it considers the longest
time span covered by the data. In the empirical analysis, however, our main variable of
interest will be PERS1985 2000, which has the advantage of being largely predetermined
with respect to rm-specic variables. We also calculate PERS1994 2007, as 1993 repre-
sents an important breaking point in Italian politics.5 The number of municipalities for
which data are available is 7652, as we exclude municipalities that disappeared merging
4Statistics for PERS1994 2007 are not reported as this variable turns out to be very highly correlated
with PERS1985 2007 (0.994) and no sizeable di¤erences exist. The very high correlation between these
two variables could be driven by lack of information on politicians in the rst years of data. As long as
the under-report of politicians is random, there are no issues of distortion in the estimates.
5As already noted, electoral rules changed in 1993. Moreover, following a series of inquisitions conducted
in 1992 and 1993 (generally referred to as Mani Pulite) and scandals that uncovered a widespread system
of corruption between entrepreneurs and politicians at all institutional levels (Tangentopoli), the political
parties that had been previously ruling Italian politics collapsed, leading to the end of the so called First
Republic. The variable PERS1994 2007 allows us to avoid the use of data pre-Mani Pulite.
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with other municipalities during the 1985-2007 period and those with key information
missing.
In the full sample, the mean and median value of PERS1985 2007 are both around
ve years and three months, with a standard deviation of one year. As PERS1985 2007
is the average length in o¢ ce of politicians in each municipality, these numbers indicate
a non-negligible variance across municipalities. PERS1985 2007 is higher in municipalities
with population smaller that 15000 inhabitants, as expected due to the aforementioned
law, lower in capital cities of provinces and regions (this is likely to be a size e¤ect since
capital cities are on average larger than other municipalities), and higher in the North.6
The last two rows of Table 1 report descriptive statistics once the sample is split
in two sub-samples, according to whether at least one politician aged 60 or less died in a
municipality in the period 1990-2005 (DEATH=1) or not (DEATH=0). As we will explain
later, we will use death of a relatively young politician as a source of exogenous variation
of political persistence. The di¤erence between the mean values of PERS1985 2007 in the
two sub-samples is around three months and is statistically signicant, with municipalities
where at least one death occurred showing lower mean. Table 1 also reports statistics
for PERS1985 2000, which is generally higher than PERS1985 2007, indicating a decline
in the length of political careers in recent years. As before the mean value is lower in
municipalities where at least one death event occurred in the 1990-2005 period.
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for other municipalities variables that will be
used in the empirical analysis, namely labor force participation rate (LFPR), population
(POP ), the elderly index, i.e. the share of inhabitants aged 65 or more (ELD_INDEX),
and the share of foreigners (SH_FOR). Data for these variables come from the 2001
Census. As a proxy for local human capital (TERT_EDU), we take the share of workers
with tertiary education measured within Local Systems of Labor (these are 686 entities
that group contiguous municipalities according to commuting patterns of workers).7
Table 3 reports pairwise correlations. As expected, PERS1985 2007 and PERS1985 2000
are (weakly) negatively correlated with population and with the binary variable DEATH.
Notice that DEATH is positively correlated with population, as a larger population of
politicians implies a larger probability of having at least one death event.
6A visual inspection of Figure 1 shows that PERS1985 2007, besides being higher in the North, is also
higher at higher altitudes, as in the Alps and Appennines.
7A detailed list of variables is available in the Appendix.
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2.2 Firm-level data
The rm-level information we use come from waves eight, nine and ten of the Observatory
over Small and Medium Enterprises. The surveys, conducted in 2001, 2004, and 2007
on a sample of Italian manufacturing rms, provide information on innovation activities
for the previous three-year periods (1998-2000, 2001-2003, and 2004-2006). In each wave
the sample is selected (partly) with a stratied method for rms with up to 500 workers,
whereas rms above this threshold are all included. Each survey contains, respectively,
4680, 4289 and 5137 manufacturing rms and some of them are interviewed more than
once (in particular 2480 are interviewed twice and 451 three times).
Around four in ten rms introduced process innovation (INN_PROC), which will
be our main dependent variable. In our view, process innovation is a better proxy for
the cost-saving and/or productivity enhancements of rms, which may be inuenced
by connections with local politicians. Instead, product innovation is more likely to be
linked to demand-pull factors, such as the demand for new goods associated with ex-
ports (see Becker and Egger [2] for a discussion). In the empirical analysis, we will also
use data on other rmscharacteristics from the same surveys, such as the total number
of employees (OCC_TOT ) and the share employed in R&D (SH_OO_RD), turnover
(TURNOV ER), age of the rm (AGE), whether the rm is an exporter (D_EXPORT ),
a corporation (SOC_CAP ), belongs to a business group (GROUP ), made use of tempo-
rary workers (EXTERNAL), and is controlled by a person (MAIN_CONTR_PERS),
and industry of activity.
2.3 The dataset
The dataset that we will use to perform our empirical analysis was obtained by merging
municipalitiesdata with rmsdata, according to the municipality where a rm is lo-
cated.8 We trimmed the sample at the rst and last percentiles of turnover, innovation
expenditure, number of employees and PERS1985 2007 to exclude outliers. We also ex-
cluded rms not operating in manufacturing, together with those located in municipalities
that experienced at least one period of special administration.9
8Some concerns may arise about the endogenous strategic location of rms. However, we believe
that rmslocations are not primarily driven by the municipality-level determinants that we are mainly
interested in, and in particular by political persistence. Michelacci and Silva [20] report that roughly 80%
of Italian entrepreneurs locate their rms in the same province where they were born.
9Under special administration, a non-elected administrator is appointed by the central government
until new elections take place. This may happen because of resignation of the mayor, maa inltrations,
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Between one fourth and one third of Italian municipalities host at least one rm inter-
viewed in the surveys (see Figure 2), with 2353 municipalities represented in the dataset.
On average there are ve rms for each municipality, but rmsdistribution is not homo-
geneous. Around 27% of the municipalities host only one rm, the median value is three
rms, 25% of the municipalities host more than ve rms, and four municipalities (Rome,
Prato, Turin and Milan) host 975 rms together. Average population of the municipalities
in the dataset is around 15500, which is larger than the average in the full sample (7200),
conrming that rms tend to settle in larger municipalities.
Descriptive statistics for our dataset are collected in Table 4. Process innovation takes
place in 41% of the observations. The average age of rms is 28, the vast majority of them
(94%) is a corporation, and the entity controlling the rm is a person in 71% of the cases.
In the lower panel of the Table, we report some descriptive statistics for municipalities
variables in the dataset. Capital cities, which are larger than average, are over-represented
in the sample: more than 21% (10%) of the rms are located in provincial (regional)
capital cities. Over-representation of rms in capital cities explains why the mean value
of PERS1985 2007 is smaller in the dataset (4.82) than it was in the full sample (5.25).
Again, PERS1985 2000 has higher mean value (5.56) than PERS1985 2007. Finally, death
of a relatively young politician in the period 1990-2005 occurred in 31% of the observations.
Pairwise correlations (Table 5) show that process innovation is positively correlated
with rm size (measured in terms of log of turnover and log of employees), with the status of
exporter and with the share of employees in R&D.10 PERS1985 2007 is positively correlated
with process innovation and the status of exporter, although the correlation coe¢ cients
are very low, and PERS1985 2000 is weakly correlated with the status of exporter. The
correlation between PERS1985 2007 and PERS1985 2000 is 0.85 and signicant at 1%.
DEATH is not correlated with process innovation and weakly correlated with exporter
status. Instead, it is negatively correlated with PERS1985 2007 and PERS1985 2000.
3 Empirical analysis
Our goal in this section is to investigate whether political persistence in the political
institutions of a municipality a¤ects the innovation activity of rms. As the dependent
variable INN_PROC is binary, we estimate a linear probability model with political
persistence as explanatory variable. The analysis is cross-sectional, with observations
municipality going bankrupt, etc.
10This is consistent with ndings by Costantini and Melitz [11], among others.
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for the three waves pooled together, given the intrinsically time-invariant nature of our
measures of persistence. Our key explanatory variable will be PERS1985 2000, which has
the advantage of being largely predetermined with respect to innovation activity between
1998 and 2006.
Before proceeding, let us discuss whether a simple linear regression of innovation ac-
tivity on local political persistence would deliver reliable results in terms of causality.
Clearly, many other factors, external or internal to the rm, play a role in determining
rmspropensity to innovate, and will be considered in our analysis. However, our main
concern is the likely presence of unobservables that could simultaneously a¤ect rmsin-
novation propensity and the local political environment, and in particular the selection
and election of politicians. For example, weak or poorly enforced institutions may lead
to adverse selection of politicians within a restricted pool of candidates, and negatively
a¤ect the selection process of rms, allowing the di¤usion of malpractice in the relation
between politicians and rms, with widespread corruption and preferential treatment of
incumbents.
Moreover, reverse causality could bias our results downwards. Low performance in
terms of innovation activity by rms in a municipality could be perceived by the elec-
torate as the consequence of mismanagement of local policies and poor choices regarding,
for example, the maintenance and development of infrastructure, the quality of the bu-
reaucracy, the e¢ ciency of public utilities provision, inducing voters to replace the ruling
political elite.11
In order to tackle endogeneity and omitted variables issues, we will estimate the model
by 2SLS. The proposed instrument is a dummy variable taking value one (zero) if at
least one (no) politician aged 60 or less died in a municipality in the considered period.
Although we can not directly test for exogeneity of the instrument, death of at least one
politician appointed in a municipality should impact on process innovation only through
political persistence. Whether the instrument is relevant is an empirical issue. The e¤ect
on political persistence of death of a politician may be negligible if he/she is replaced by
someone already serving in another role (as it may be more likely in municipalities with
less than 15000 inhabitants) or who was in o¢ ce before. Thus, we tried several rst stage
regressions using dummies for death events calculated over di¤erent time intervals and
selected as instrument death calculated over the 1995-2000 period, which turned out to
11The idea that economic outcomes may a¤ect electoral outcomes can be traced back to theoretical
contributions by Rogo¤and Sibert [24], Rogo¤ [23] and Persson and Tabellini [21], among others. According
to Brender and Drazen [7], such e¤ects are not so clearly supported by empirical evidence, however.
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be signicantly associated with our measures of political persistence.12
The general specication of our model is the following:
INN_PROCi = 1Xi + 2PERS1985 2000i + "i (1)
with rst stage:
PERS1985 2000i = 1Xi + 2DEATH1995 2000i + i (2)
where i indicates rms, Xi is a vector that, depending on specications, includes region
(20 regions) and province (103 provinces) dummies, to capture determinants of innovation
activity related to institutional characteristics which are common across municipalities
belonging to such entities (including, for example, banking development in the province of
residence, which has been found to positively a¤ect rmsprocess innovation by Benfratello
et al. [4]), dummies for the sector of activity (23 sectors), and wave dummies.
In some specications, we include further proxies that control for the local environ-
ment at municipality level, such as the elderly index, the share of foreigners, labor force
participation rate, the share of workers with tertiary education, altitude, a polynomial in
POP to take into account population-related e¤ects13, a set of dummies for population
size, POP < 3K, 3K < POP < 10K, 10K < POP < 30K, 30K < POP < 100K,
100K < POP < 250K, 250K < POP < 1M , POP > 1M , chosen to match the dis-
continuous changes in the number of councilmen occurring at these thresholds as ruled
by law, a dummy taking value one (zero) for municipalities with more (less) than 15000
inhabitants, and dummies indicating the semesters in which elections took place.14
Among rmscharacteristics, we consider the (log) number of employees, (log) turnover,
the share of workers employed in R&D, age, dummies indicating whether the rm declares
to be a corporation, to be part of a business group, to be controlled by a person, to be an
exporter, and whether it made use of temporary workers. We also use dummies indicating
whether the rm operates in a high tech-sector or in a sector strongly dependent on public
demand. For the latter two variables, our classication follows Benfratello et al [4] and
Cingano and Pinotti [13], respectively.15
12 In particular, death calculated over the 1990-1995 (1990-1995 or 2000-2005) period was not signicantly
associated with PERS1985 2000 (PERS1985 2007) in the rst stage. Also, death calculated over the longer
1990-2000 (1990-2005) period was not signicantly associated with PERS1985 2000 (PERS1985 2007).
13Population may also proxy for the level of development as data for GDP at municipality level are not
avilable.
14As expected, these population-related controls turn out ot to be highly signicant in the rst stage.
As rmsdecisions, for example regarding location, are not exogenous to municipality size, they could not
be used as excluded instruments.
15A detailed list of variables and their denition is provided in the Appendix.
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3.1 Estimation results
Table 6 reports the estimated coe¢ cient for our key explanatory variables obtained under
di¤erent specications of the model. In all cases, reported standard errors are robust to
heteroskedasticity. We also provide estimation results (in parenthesis) obtained by cluster-
ing standard errors at municipality level, the dimension along which political persistence
varies.
We rst estimate (1) by OLS, including among regressors only region, wave and
semester dummies, together with a dummy indicating whether the municipality is a capital
city. As shown in column (1), this estimation delivers a coe¢ cient of PERS1985 2000 that is
not signicantly di¤erent from zero. Column (2) reports results obtained by probit estima-
tion of the same specication which yields the same point estimate (and standard errors)
for the coe¢ cient of PERS1985 2000. In column 3, the model is estimated by 2SLS using
DEATH1995 2000 as instrument for PERS1985 2000. In the rst stage DEATH1995 2000 is
strongly negatively correlated with PERS1985 2000, with the Staiger-Stocks rule of thumb
of F > 10, indicating non-weak instruments, being largely satised.16 The point estimate
of DEATH1995 2000 suggests that the death of (at least) one politician aged 60 or less
lowers average length in o¢ ce of politicians in a municipality by roughly two months, after
controlling for region, semester, wave, and capital city xed e¤ects. In the second stage
the coe¢ cient of PERS1985 2000 is negative and signicant at 5% level (10% if standard
errors are clustered at municipality level). The point estimate suggests that a one standard
deviation increase in PERS1985 2000 implies a reduction in the probability of innovation
by 20%.17
In column 4, we add municipality controls, the polynomial of population, and pop-
ulation dummies. The coe¢ cient of PERS1985 2000 is unchanged. Among municipality
controls, only the share of workers with tertiary education has positive e¤ect on innovation
(at 1% level), with an estimated coe¢ cient of 0.2755 [s.e. 0.1020]. Other controls are not
16Given the rm-level nature of our analysis and that DEATH1995 2000 and PERS1985 2000 are both
municipality-level variables, this correlation may be due to the presence of many observations for which the
association between the two variables is negative. In order to check whether the strenght of our instrument
captures a true statistical association, we regress PERS1985 2000 on the same controls used in column 3,
employing the full sample with municipality-level data rather than the dataset with rm-level observations.
Estimation by robust OLS delivers a coe¢ cient for DEATH1995 2000 equal to -0.1578 (signicant at 1%
level), conrming the validity of our instrument.
17A simple 2SLS regression of INN_PROC on PERS1985 2000 and a constant (with rst stage only in-
cluding DEATH1995 2000 and a constant) already delivers a negative and signicant at 10% level coe¢ cient
for PERS1985 2000 (point estimate -0.0279).
11
signicant at conventional levels.
In column 5, we replace region with province dummies, and start to add proxies of
rms characteristics. We rst include rms characteristics that are less likely to be
endogenous to innovation activity, such as the log number of employees, age, dummies
indicating whether the rm is controlled by a person, belongs to a business group, is a
corporation, and dummies indicating whether the rm operates in a high-tech sector or in
a sector strongly dependent on public demand. The coe¢ cient of PERS1985 2000 is very
similar and still signicant at 5% level. Controls that turn out to be signicant at 1%
level are the log number of employees, with estimated coe¢ cient 0.0831 (s.e. 0.0057), and
the public demand dummy, with estimated coe¢ cient 0.0415 (s.e. 0.0101). The high-tech
dummy is signicant at 5% level, with estimated coe¢ cient 0.0250 (s.e. 0.0111). The
log number of employees takes into account scale e¤ects at rm level, while the positive
coe¢ cient associated to the public demand dummy is likely to be due to the fact that
the highly innovative chemical sector is also a sector highly dependent on public demand.
Finally, in column 6 we add all other rm-level controls, in particular (the log of) turnover,
the share of labor force in R&D, dummies indicating use of temporary workers and the
status of exporter, and sector dummies. The estimated coe¢ cient of PERS1985 2000 is
again unchanged.18
In Table 7 we report results obtained using alternative measures of political persistence
and instruments as robustness checks, taking the models specications that include mu-
nicipality variables (column 4, Table 6) and some rmscharacteristics (column 5, Table 6)
as benchmarks. In columns 1 and 2, the measure of persistence is PERS1985 2007. Results
are similar to those obtained using PERS1985 2000, both in the rst and in the second
stage. When we try PERS1994 2007, political persistence is still negative and signicant at
5% condence level in the second stage, as shown in columns 3 and 4. Next, we replicate
the estimate including municipality and rm-level variables (as in column 5, Table 6),
using PERS1985 2000, PERS1985 2007 and PERS1994 2007 (one at a time) as measures
of persistence and instrumenting them with the alternative variable NDEATH1995 2000,
that is the number of politicians aged 60 or less dead in a municipality divided by the
average number of politicians in o¢ ce in the 1995-2000 period.19 Even if more accurate in
18 In this specication the estimated e¤ect of the share of labor force in R&D is positive and highly
signicant, while the coe¢ cient of the high-tech dummy becomes negative. This may be due to the
positive correlation between these variables.
19When DEATH1995 2000 is used, even if we control for the size of municipalities by including population
dummies and the population polynomial, we attribute the same average e¤ect of a death event on political
persistence in municipalities with di¤erent numbers of politicians. Instead, when NDEATH1995 2000 is
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principle, this instrument delivers weaker rst stage estimates, with a sizable reduction of
the F-statistics in two out of three cases. Moreover, the estimated coe¢ cients of political
persistence are still negative but no longer signicant in the second stage. The most stable
results are obtained with PERS1985 2000, our main measure of persistence: although not
signicant at conventional level, the estimated coe¢ cient of political persistence is neg-
ative (14% condence level) in the second stage and the F-statistic remains large in the
rst stage.
3.2 Di¤erential responses to political persistence and alternative depen-
dent variables
We believe that our results so far provide robust evidence that local political persistence
determines a negative impact on rmsinnovation activities leading to productivity im-
provements, after controlling for xed institutional features at region and province level,
the economic environment at the municipality level, and rmscharacteristics. The e¤ect
is sizable, as our point estimates indicate that an increase in average political longevity in
the municipality by one standard deviation reduces the probability of process innovation
by 20-30% (depending on the measure of political persistence). In particular, according
to estimates obtained in our preferred specication (column 5, Table 6), a six months
increase in average political longevity reduces the probability that a rm located in the
municipality innovates by 15%. As discussed in the Introduction, this nding is consistent
with a negative e¤ect of political stability on rmspropensity to invest in innovation to
increase productivity. This may be due to the fact that, by exploiting political connections
with stable politicians, rms may reduce the incidence of bureaucratic and administrative
costs and remain competitive even if they do not upgrade their technologies (see Bellet-
tini, Berti Ceroni and Prarolo [3] for a theoretical model developing this view) or may
obtain preferential treatment in public procurement or other activities controlled by local
politicians.
In order to further investigate the relationship between political persistence and in-
novation activity, we consider alternative specications of our model. First, we allow for
the possibility of di¤erential e¤ects of political persistence on process innovation, depend-
ing on rmscharacteristics, such as age and sector of activity, that may determine the
importance of stability of the political elite for the rm. For example, older rms may
used, the number of death events is normalized by the number of politicians in each municipality, so that
the coe¢ cient in the rst stage represents the change of persistence (in number of years) if all the politicians
had to die contemporaneously, under the assumption that tenure is the same for all politicians.
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have established stronger connections with politicians and therefore be more a¤ected by
political persistence than younger rms. Also, the value of political connections and the
e¤ect of political persistence may be higher for rms operating in industries highly de-
pendent on the public sector. Next, we consider alternative dependent variables, such
as product innovation, rmsturnover and size. Product innovation may be mainly de-
termined by demand-driven external factors una¤ected by the local environment and the
average longevity in o¢ ce of politicians. Instead, the latter may inuence protability and
therefore measures of rmsperformance, such as turnover and size.
We start by testing for di¤erential responses to political persistence by including in-
teraction terms in the models specication with municipality and rm-level variables
(Column 5, Table 6). We investigate rst the e¤ect of rmsage by introducing two in-
teraction terms where PERS1985 2000 is multiplied by two dummy variables, taking value
one when the rm is younger or older than 15 years, respectively. In the rst stage, the
interactions of DEATH1995 2000 with the two dummies are used as instruments.20 As
shown in column 1, Table 8, the estimated coe¢ cient of PERS1985 2000 for young rms is
not di¤erent from zero, while for old rms it is negative and signicant at 5% condence
level.21 First stage estimates, not reported for brevity, do not indicate problems related
to weak instruments. Next, we focus on di¤erential responses of rms belonging or not
to industries classied as mainly serving the public sector. As before, we introduce two
interaction terms where PERS1985 2000 is multiplied by two dummies indicating whether
the rm operates in an industry highly dependent on the public sector or it does not,
respectively, and use interactions of DEATH1995 2000 with the two dummies as instru-
ments. It turns out that the impact of PERS1985 2000 on innovation activity is slightly
larger for rms operating in industries highly dependent on the public sector.22 As we
found before, the public dummy variable is positive and signicant (at 10% level), with an
estimated coe¢ cient of 0.3422 (s.e. 0.1946). Again, rst stage estimates are not reported
for brevity.
Columns 3 and 4, Table 8, report results obtained considering alternative dependent
variables. When we use product innovation (INN_PROD), rather than process innova-
tion, as dependent variable, the probability to innovate is not a¤ected by PERS1985 2000
(column 3).23 Instead, turnover (LOG_TURN) is positively a¤ected by political persis-
20See Wooldridge [25], Chapter 6, for details.
21The Wald test for di¤erent coe¢ cients is not signicant at conventional level: the condence level is
only 16%.
22The Wald test for di¤erent coe¢ cients is signicant only at 12% condence level.
23 In their study of the e¤ect of local banking development on rms innovative activities, Benfratello
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tence, which is signicant at 10% level (column 4). Occupation (LOG_OCC), another
measure of rm size, is not signicantly related to PERS1985 2000 (column 5).
Overall, these results suggest that the negative inuence of political persistence on the
probability of process innovation is more important in older rms and (even if slightly) in
rms operating in industries that mainly serve the public sector, where political connec-
tions are likely to be stronger and more widespread. Moreover, political persistence, which
negatively a¤ects the probability of process innovation, has no e¤ects on product innova-
tion, and positive e¤ect (if any) on rmsmarket performance. Although they are based on
a completely di¤erent approach, these ndings can be considered complementary to those
of Cingano and Pinotti [13], who provide evidence that political connections, measured by
the presence of local politicians among employees, grant Italian rms a premium in terms
of revenues, which is not related to improvements in productivity, and is driven by rms
operating in sectors that most intensively provide inputs to the public administrations.
4 Conclusion
The political and economic environment in which a rm operates is crucial in shaping its
innovation activity. In this paper we investigate whether longevity in o¢ ce of administra-
tors appointed in local political institutions a¤ects the probability of process innovation
of rms.
Our analysis is based on a rich dataset where survey-based information on Italian rms
in the 1996-2008 period are merged with data on administrators serving in local political
institutions between 1985 and 2007. Starting from information on individual political
careers, we constructed measures of political persistence, dened as the average longevity
in o¢ ce of politicians in a municipality in a given period. These measures were included
among explanatory variables of the probability of process innovation of rms located in
the municipality. To isolate the causal e¤ect of political persistence on innovation, we
estimate a linear probability model by 2SLS, using death of relatively young politicians as
a source of exogenous variation of political persistence.
Our estimates support a sizable negative e¤ect of political persistence on the proba-
bility of process innovation which is robust to the inclusion of rm and municipality-level
controls and several dummies, including province and region xed e¤ects. There is also
some evidence that the negative impact of political persistence on innovation is stronger
et al. [4] nd that the evidence of such e¤ect is weaker when product innovation, rather than process
innovation, is considered.
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in older rms and rms operating in industries that mainly serve the public sector, and
that political persistence has positive e¤ect on rmsmarket performance, as measured by
turnover.
These ndings are consistent with the view that political stability may reduce rms
incentive to increase productivity, possibly as it allows rms to establish and exploit
connections with long-tenured politicians and to obtain preferential treatment in domains
of economic activity controlled by local administrators.
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5 Appendix
PERS1985 2007 PERS1985 2000
Mean St.Dev. Min Max Mean St.Dev. Min Max N.
Full Sample 5.25 1.00 1.84 13.43 6.12 1.16 1.79 13.43 7652
Capital cities 4.31 0.55 3.26 6.02 5.07 0.67 3.77 7.03 99
POP<15K 5.34 0.98 1.84 13.43 6.22 1.14 2.26 13.43 7004
POP>15K 4.29 0.75 1.99 6.62 5.01 0.86 1.79 7.66 648
North 5.55 0.97 2.76 13.43 6.48 1.13 3.28 13.43 4295
Center-South 4.87 0.92 1.85 8.83 5.65 1.04 1.03 10.19 3357
DEATH=1 4.99 0.95 2.32 9.32 5.79 1.12 2.84 10.32 886
DEATH=0 5.29 1.00 1.84 13.43 6.16 1.16 1.79 13.43 6766
Table 1. Descriptive statistics: PERS1985 2007 and PERS1985 2000
Mean St.Dev. Min Max N.
LFPR 0.59 0.07 0.27 0.83 7652
POP (X1000) 7.24 40.41 0.033 2546.8 7652
ELD_INDEX 0.18 0.06 0.05 0.54 7652
SH_FOR 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.24 7652
TERT_EDU 0.18 0.06 0.08 0.64 7652
Table 2. Descriptive statistics: municipalitiesvariables
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PERS1985 2007 PERS1985 2000 DEATH LFPR POP ELD_INDEX SH_FOR
PERS1985 2000 .897*
DEATH -.077* -.084*
LFPR .049* .060* .021
POP -.118* -.130* .075* .027*
ELD_INDEX .182* .195* -.016 -.737* -.068*
SH_FOR .084* .100* .018 .385* -.024* -.112*
TERT_EDU .071* .066* -.037* -.029* -.090* .067* .013
Table 3. Pairwise correlations: municipalitiesvariables. *=1% signicance.
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Figure 1. Spatial distribution: PERS1985 2007 (LPERS in the map)
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Obs Mean St.Dev. Min Max
INN_PROC 12144 0.409 0.492 0 1
AGE 11869 28.14 20.48 0 313
GROUP 12144 0.231 0.421 0 1
SOC_CAP 12144 0.942 0.234 0 1
EXTERNAL 12144 0.432 0.496 0 1
MAIN_CONTR_PERSON 12144 0.711 0.452 0 1
D_EXPORT 12144 0.673 0.469 0 1
TURNOVER 12066 16.8M 3.96M 0 850M
OCC_TOT 12144 76.6 136.99 4 1510
SH_OCC_RD 11711 0.052 0.127 0 1
CAP_REG 12144 0.109 0.312 0 1
CAP_PROV 12144 0.215 0.411 0 1
TERT_EDU 12144 0.156 0.058 0.077 0.535
ELD_INDEX 12144 0.157 0.036 0.060 0.346
SH_FOR 12144 0.039 0.022 0 0.185
LFPR 12144 0.633 0.044 0.452 0.768
POP 12144 139.7K 377.6K 339 2,546.8K
PERS1985 2007 12144 4.820 0.681 2.756 6.785
PERS1985 2000 12144 5.561 0.867 3.151 9.182
DEATH 12144 0.311 0.463 0 1
Table 4. Descriptive statistics for the dataset
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INN_PROC D_EXP LOG_TURN LOG_OCC SH_OCC_RD PERS1985 2007 PERS1985 2000
D_EXP .081*
LOG_TURN .137* .271*
LOG_OCC .164* .267* .797*
SH_OCC_RD .090* .047* .041* .030*
PERS1985 2007 .026* .042* .000 -.003 .023
PERS1985 2000 .018 .033* -.022 -.030 .022 .848*
DEATH -.007 .035* .004 -.014 .005 -.186* -.254*
Table 5. Pairwise correlations: selected variables. *=1% signicance.
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Figure 2. Municipalities hosting at least one rm (in dark)
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS Probit IV IV IV IV
PERS1985 2000 .0088 .0088 -.2449 -.2436 -.2593 -.2509
[.0084] [.0084] [.1107]** [.1116]** [.1254]** [.1284]**
(.0100) (.0100) (.1311)* (.1311)* (.1434)* (.1450)*
MUNIC. CONTROLS X X X
FIRM CONTROLS SOME FULL
REGION X X X X
PROVINCE X X
SECTOR X
WAVE X X X X X X
CAPITAL CITY X X X X X X
POP DUMMIES X X X
POP POLINOMIAL X X X
SEMESTER X X X X X X
FIRST STAGE
DEATH1995 2000 -.1693 -.1932 -.1823 -.1802
[.0194]*** [.0210]*** [.0219]*** [.0222]***
F 76.04 84.82 69.56 65.93
Observations 12144 12137 12144 12144 11869 11353
Table 6. Results of OLS, Probit and IV estimation. Robust standard errors in brackets (clustered
at municipality level in parentheses).
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
IV IV IV IV IV IV IV
PERS1985 2000 -.2543
[.1727]
PERS1985 2007 -.3908 -.4016 -.4599
[.1812]** [.2002]** [.3332]
PERS1994 2007 -.3596 -.3687 -.4071
[.1678]** [.1815]** [.2878]
REGION X X
PROVINCE X X X X X
FIRM CONTROLS X X X X X
FIRST STAGE
DEATH1995 2000 -.1204 -.1177 -.1309 -.1283
[.0191]*** [.0199]*** [.0191]*** [.0198]***
NDEATH1995 2000 -3.4966 -1.9335 -2.1846
[0.5731]*** [.5213]*** [.5200]***
F 39.56 35.05 47.06 41.86 37.21 13.76 17.64
Observations 12144 11869 12144 11869 11869 11869 11869
Table 7. Results of IV estimations. Robust standard errors in brackets.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dep.Var INN_PROC INN_PROC INN_PROD LOG_TURN LOG_OCC
PERS1985 2000 * DAGE<15 -.2092 .1362 .3117 .3570
[.1287] [.1151] [.1879]* [.2175]
PERS1985 2000 * DAGE>15 -.2672
[.1258]**
PERS1985 2000 * D_PUBLIC -.2906
[.1298]**
PERS1985 2000 * (1-D_PUBLIC) -.2366
[.1246]*
Wald Test 0.16 0.12
FIRST STAGE
DEATH1995 2000 -.1823 -.1842 -.1815
[.0219]*** [.0219]*** [.0225]***
Observations 11550 11869 11869 11751 11869
Table 8. Results of IV estimations for splitted sample and alternative dependent variables.
Robust standard errors in brackets.
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5.1 Municipality-level variables
ALTITUDE : altitude of the town hall, from ISTAT.
CAP_REG : dummy for region capital, from ISTAT.
CAP_PROV : dummy for province capital, from ISTAT.
COM : full name of municipality, from ISTAT.
CSOUTH : dummy for Center, South and Islands.
D_15 : dummy for municipalities with population in 2001 above 15K.
D_PR: dummies for provinces.
D_REG : dummies for regions.
DEATH 1995 2000: dummy indicating whether at least one politician aged 60 years or
lower died during his/her appointment in the period between 1/1/1996 and 31/12/2000,
from Italian Ministry of Internal A¤airs (MI).
ELD_INDEX : elderly index (share of 65+ inhabitants) from 2001 census, from ISTAT.
LFPR: labor force participation rate from 2001 census, from ISTAT.
NDEATH 1995 2000: number of politicians aged 60 years or lower dead during their
appointment in the period between 1/1/1996 and 31/12/2000, divided by the average
number of politicians in place at any point in time, from MI.
N_ISTAT : code of municipality from ISTAT classication (release date 31/03/09).
N_PROV : code of province from ISTAT classication (107 provinces, classication of
2006).
PERSY 1 Y 2: average number of years spent within the local institutions in the pe-
riod Y 1   Y 2 by politicians of each municipality, with Y 1   Y 2 = f1985   2000; 1985  
2007; 1995  2007g), from MI.
POP : population from 2001 census, from ISTAT.
SH_FOR: share of foreign residents from 2001 census, from ISTAT.
TERT_EDU : share of labor force with tertiary education at the Local System of Labor
level in 2001, from ISTAT.
5.2 Firm-level variables
Source: Observatory over Small and Medium Enterprises, Capitalia, waves 8 and 9, and
Unicredit, wave 10.
AGE : age of the rm.
COM : full name of municipality in which the rm is located, coded from ISTAT.
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D_EXPORT : dummy taking value of one if the rm declared to export a positive
share of the production in the period covered by the survey (1998-2000, 2001-2003, and
2004-2006)
D_HITECH : dummy taking value one for the following industries: 24 - chemicals; 29
- non-electric machinery; 30 - o¢ ce equipment and computers; 31 - electric machinery;
32 - electronic material, measuring and communication tools, TV and radio; 33 - medical
apparels and instruments; 34 - vehicles; 35 - other transportation.
D_PUBLIC : dummy taking value one for the following industries: 21 - paper prod-
ucts; 22 - printing and publishing; 24 - chemicals; 25 - rubber and plastics; 28 - metal
products; 29 - non-electric machinery; 33 - medical apparels and instruments; 35 - other
transportation.
D_SECT : industry dummies (value one if the rms main activity is within the indus-
try, zero otherwise): 15 - food and beverages; 16 - tobacco; 17 - textiles; 18 - clothing; 19
- leather; 20 - wood; 21 - paper products; 22 - printing and publishing; 23 - oil rening;
24 - chemicals; 25 - rubber and plastics; 26 - non-metal minerals; 27 - metals; 28 - metal
products; 29 - non-electric machinery; 30 - o¢ ce equipment and computers; 31 - electric
machinery; 32 - electronic material, measuring and communication tools, TV and radio; 33
- medical apparels and instruments; 34 - vehicles; 35 - other transportation; 36 - furniture;
37 - waste management and recycling.
D_WAVE : wave dummies (9, 8 and 10).
EXTERNAL: dummy taking value of one if the rm declared to use workforce from
external work agencies in the period covered by the survey (1998-2000, 2001-2003, and
2004-2006).
GROUP : dummy taking value one if the rm declared to be part of a business group
in the period covered by the survey (1998-2000, 2001-2003, and 2004-2006).
INN_PROC (INN_PROD): innovation dummy taking value 1 if the rm declared to
have introduced at least one process (product) innovation in the period covered by the
survey (1998-2000, 2001-2003, and 2004-2006), and zero otherwise.
MAIN_CONTR_PERS : dummy indicating whether the rms main controller is a
person.
LOG_TURN : log of turnover in the rst year of the survey.
LOG_OCC : log of number of workers in the last year of each survey.
OCC_TOT : number of workers in the last year of the survey.
SH_OCC_RD : share of workforce working in R&D activity in the last year of each
survey.
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SOC_CAP : dummy taking value one if the rm declared to be a corporation in the
period covered by the survey (1998-2000, 2001-2003, and 2004-2006).
TURNOVER: turnover in the rst year of the survey.
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